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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 11-2133 
_____________ 
                         
DEBORAH REICHERT, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY                         
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-03832) 
District Judge: Honorable Joel H. Slomsky 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 21, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed May 30, 2012)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
The single issue in this appeal is whether plaintiff-appellant Deborah Reichert is 
entitled to “stack,” or aggregate, the underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage on her 
insurance policy with the UIM coverage on her parents’ insurance policy.  The District 
Court concluded that, by virtue of the household exclusion in her parents’ insurance 
2 
 
policy, Reichert is not entitled to stack the two policies’ coverage.  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Reichert was involved in an automobile accident while she was driving her Ford 
Explorer, and suffered injuries caused by the other driver.  She settled with that driver’s 
insurer for the insured’s liability limit of $25,000.  Because her medical costs exceeded 
that amount, she also filed a claim for UIM benefits
1
 pursuant to her insurance policy 
with State Farm (the “Reichert Policy”), which insures her Ford Explorer.  Her policy 
with State Farm contains a “stacking” provision, which allows “the insured to add the 
coverages available from different vehicles and/or different policies to provide a greater 
amount of coverage available under any one vehicle or policy.”  McGovern v. Erie Ins. 
Group, 796 A.2d 343, 344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).   
 At the time of the accident, Reichert resided with her parents, George and Ella 
Downing, as well as with her son, Christopher Reichert.  Under the stacking provision in 
her policy, Reichert sought to stack the UIM coverage provided by her parents’ 
automobile insurance policy with State Farm (the “Downing Policy”), as well as with her 
son’s automobile insurance policy, also with State Farm, filing claims under all three 
policies.  The Downing Policy contains two operative provisions: a stacking waiver and a 
household exclusion.  The stacking waiver provides, “By signing this waiver, I am 
rejecting stacked limits of underinsured motorist coverage under the policy for myself 
                                              
1
 Underinsured motorist benefits pay the insured when a third party causes an accident 
but has insufficient funds under his policy to pay the full amount of damages.   
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and members of my household under which the limits of coverage available would be the 
sums of limits for each motor vehicle insured under the policy.  Instead the limits of 
coverage that I am purchasing shall be reduced to the limits stated in the policy.  I 
knowingly and voluntarily reject the stacked limits of coverage.  I understand that my 
premiums will be reduced if I reject this coverage.”  (App. 4a.)  Thus, while the Reichert 
Policy permits stacking of UIM coverage, the Downing Policy expressly waives any 
stacking of UIM coverage.  Christopher Reichert’s policy with State Farm does not 
contain a stacking waiver or a household exclusion clause. 
The household exclusion in the Downing Policy, in turn, provides, “There is no 
coverage for any insured who sustains bodily injury while occupying a motor vehicle 
owned by you or any resident relative if it is not your car or a newly acquired car.”  (Id. at 
5a.)  “Insured” means those named on the policy, as well any “resident relative.”  A 
“resident relative” is “a person, other than [the named insured], who resides primarily 
with the first person shown as the named insured on the Declarations Page and who is: 1. 
related to that named insured or his or her spouse by blood, marriage, or adoption.”  (Id.)   
 State Farm has acknowledged that Reichert is entitled to UIM benefits under her 
policy and her son’s policy by virtue of her purchasing stacking coverage, but denied 
Reichert’s claim seeking to stack the UIM coverage of the Downing Policy, in light of 
that policy’s stacking waiver and household exclusion. 
 Reichert filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, 
seeking a declaration that she is entitled to stack the UIM coverage of the Downing 
Policy with that of her son’s and her own.  State Farm removed the case to the United 
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  The parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment.  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor 
of State Farm, and concluded that the household exclusion squarely applies to Reichert 
and prevents her from receiving UIM coverage under the Downing Policy.  Thus, the 
District Court did not need to, and did not, address whether the stacking waiver in the 
Downing Policy is binding on Reichert, notwithstanding the fact that her own policy 
permitted stacking.   
II.
2
 
 Reichert argues that, rather than relying exclusively on the household exclusion, 
the District Court should have addressed whether the stacking waiver in the Downing 
Policy prevented her from stacking UIM coverage from that policy.  We disagree.  The 
District Court correctly concluded that a valid household exclusion in an automobile 
insurance policy precludes coverage, so the applicability of stacking provisions need not 
be addressed.  Reichert clearly falls within the scope of the household exclusion, as she is 
a “resident relative” of the named insureds and was operating a vehicle not covered by 
the Downing Policy at the time of her accident. 
Furthermore, in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Riley, 352 F.3d 804 
(3d Cir. 2003), applying Pennsylvania law, we enforced a household exclusion to prevent 
a daughter from recovering additional UIM benefits under her father’s policy.  We relied 
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 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and § 1441.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment, applying the same standard the district court did to determine 
whether summary judgment was appropriate.  State Auto Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro 
Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Prudential Property & Casualty 
Insurance Company v. Colbert, 813 A.2d 747 (Pa. 2002), in which it enforced a 
household exclusion where the insured purchased UIM benefits and attempted to stack 
the benefits of his parents’ insurance policy.  The Supreme Court reasoned that not 
enforcing the exclusion would force the insurer to pay for risks it did not know it was 
insuring.  Id. at 754.  The same reasoning applies here; allowing Reichert to stack her 
parents’ UIM coverage would force State Farm to pay for a risk it did not know it was 
insuring.  See also Erie Ins. Exchange v. Baker, 972 A.2d 507 (Pa. 2009) (enforcing a 
household exclusion). 
Nevertheless, Reichert urges that we should reverse the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment based on a concurring opinion in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
decision in Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Ayers (“Geico”), 18 A.3d 1093 (Pa. 
2011).  There, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, without an opinion, the lower 
court’s ruling that the household vehicle exclusion in an insurance policy prevented 
stacking of UIM coverage.  Justice Saylor briefly commented that, absent “risk-based 
justification,” he would disapprove of an insurer that insures many vehicles in one 
household under separate policies to “subvert intra-policy stacking.”  Id.  Justice Saylor 
concluded, however, that enforcing the household exclusion in that case was justified.   
We decline to read Justice Saylor’s concurrence as casting doubt on the rule that a 
valid household exclusion provision precludes coverage, and thereby prevents an insured 
from stacking UIM coverage.  See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d at 811; Erie Ins. 
Exchange, 972 A.2d at 362; Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 813 A.2d at 754. 
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III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Reichert’s motion for certification to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
